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Stories of firms that exceed local compliance requirements in their environmental
performance appear routinely. However, we have limited theoretical explanations
of what propels these firms to exceed compliance. Our theory suggests that global
competitive and institutional pressures lead multinational firms to develop high-
level, environmental management systems (EMS) that make them more competi-
tive. For economic and other reasons, select firms make the choice to rationalize
their collective environmental performance to the highest common denominator
rather than the lowest. Regulations around the world differ widely and are a mov-
ing target in many settings. The need to comply with such myriad, shifting rules
leads to firms creating EMS to help stay ahead of regulations worldwide. Using in-
stitutional and internationalization theories as our basis, we offer a propositional
model concerning global competitive/institutional pressures and their effects on
corporate environmental performance. We conclude the paper with a discussion of
the implications of the model.
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It really doesn’t matter what they do in Washington in trying to reduce envi-
ronmental regulations. We are a global company and play by a global set of
rules.
—Dr. Braden Allenby, Vice President,
Environment, Health and Safety,
AT&T (personal communication, June 22, 1996)
Worldwide, GM is integrating its environmental management systems,
based on ISO 14001 specifications, into a common system. These systems
include GM’s Environmental Performance Criteria (EPC) which assist our
business units in protecting human health and the environment when regu-
latory programs do not clearly address these goals.
—General Motors (2002)
Bristol-Meyers Squibb’s internal standards go beyond legal compliance
and apply to all of our facilities worldwide. The EHS [Environmental
Health And Safety] Codes of Practice set forth Bristol-Meyer Squibb’s
EHS requirements for all of our business functions and facilities around the
world
—Bristol-Myers Squibb (2003)
The above quotes suggest an intriguing trend in worldwide business
practice—the globalization of corporate environmental performance.
However, it is not clear why this trend has occurred. In this article, we
examine the linkage between environmental performance and firm glob-
alization. The globalization of environmental performance is but one
component of the general trend toward the globalization of business. Luo
(1999) reports over $630 billion in total foreign direct investment in 1995
alone (his last year of available data). Data gleaned from recent U.S.
Department of Commerce and Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) publications suggest this figure may have
exceeded $1 trillion in 2002. The push for globalization is not something
that many firms can ignore. Even firms that choose not to engage in busi-
ness outside the borders of their home countries are likely to face competi-
tors who have made such a choice. As such, even in a local market, a firm
may face issues of globalization. When firms develop strategies that take
them outside of their domestic borders, they face two sets of pressures: the
need for global integration (homogenization) and the need for responsive-
ness to local markets (e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz,
1987). These are not mutually exclusive forces (Ghoshal & Nohria,
1993). Rather, firms can face high or low levels of each force
simultaneously.
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The pressures for globalization and local market responsiveness are
even more apparent in the case of environmental performance. Efficient
environmental management systems (EMS) require compliance with
environmental regulations, which can vary substantially. This variation
further increases the organizational complexity of international business
operations. Standardization across the worldwide operations of multina-
tional firms is also challenging. Increasingly, however, multinational
enterprises (MNEs) choose a global approach to environmental manage-
ment consistent with the quotations at the start of this article. Such global
approaches lead to overall better environmental performance for firms as
they rationalize their systems to the most stringent regulatory schema
rather than the weakest.
In the remainder of this article, we present the following: First, we
describe the global and institutional pressures that push multinational
firms toward higher levels of environmental performance. These pres-
sures include forces that stem from the multiplicity of regulatory trajecto-
ries that firms face in the complex global context, from the institutional
forces of societal “green” movements throughout the world, and from
those forces pushing firms specifically toward life-cycle-oriented envi-
ronmental management (LCOEM). As part of our review of the regulatory
pressures, we examine existing literature that refutes what is called the
pollution haven hypothesis that suggests MNEs seek out low-regulation
countries so they do not have to worry about their environmental perfor-
mance. From our review of the three sets of forces, we develop a proposi-
tional model of the antecedents of high-level environmental performance
by multinationals. We conclude the article with a discussion of the
implications of our model and some ideas for future research.
GLOBAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
PRESSURES FOR HIGH-LEVEL
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
Environmental issues present a unique challenge to the firm in terms of
the global integration versus local responsiveness dilemma. In this article,
we examine the effects of global and institutional pressures on firms
regarding their environmental performance and how these pressures drive
firms to exceed the minimum standards of environmental regulatory com-
pliance everywhere they operate—particularly in those countries with the
most stringent regulations. By meeting or exceeding compliance every-
where they operate, firms will, by necessity, reach high levels of overall
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environmental performance. This idea is consistent with Margretta (1997)
as well as Rugman and Verbeke (1998a) who argued specifically,
MNEs design their production processes according to best global practices.
MNEs operate in accordance with the most stringent environmental regula-
tions prevailing in the relevant countries where they operate. (pp. 371-372)
The more that firms adopt a global approach to their overall business,
that is, one where they implement (perhaps with only modest local modifi-
cations) a consistent strategy worldwide, the more applicable our argu-
ments in this article become. Perlmutter’s (1969) classification of multi-
national firms describes three approaches that firms take as they
internationalize—geocentric, polycentric, and ethnocentric. Geocentric
firms are ones that develop “a global, cosmopolitan orientation that is not
tied [necessarily] to any particular national identity” (Kostova & Zaheer,
1999, p. 73). It is such global (geocentric) firms that we argue are most
likely to achieve high levels of environmental performance as we describe
below. Such MNEs are more likely to face reputation effects and other
sanctions if they fail to achieve higher levels of environmental perfor-
mance. Such a global strategy is fundamentally different from (a) what
can be thought of as a multidomestic (or polycentric in Perlmutter’s, 1969,
terms) strategy, that is, where firms develop “a multiplicity of identities to
reflect each of the countries they operate in” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p.
73), or (b) an international (ethnocentric, according to Perlmutter, 1969)
strategy where firms have “their identity is strongly rooted in the home
country” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p. 73) and use foreign markets only to
supplement their domestic sales (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Polycentric
or ethnocentric firms that are more focused on specific countries are also
less likely to develop EMS that produce the highest levels of
environmental performance.
Firms with a multidomestic strategy sometimes address environmental
issues with a two-tiered approach of both a local and a global approach to
regulation. This approach derives from the fact that countries individually
develop regulations that govern the environmental performance of firms.
Even the European Union (EU), which is slowly homogenizing regula-
tions across its member states, allows EU member countries to develop or
maintain individually stricter standards. This multiplicity of standards
would seem to push firms toward more local strategies to address the dif-
ferent sets of rules. One might expect that the more decentralized the firm,
the more decentralized the environmental strategy. However, firms
increasingly see the competitive advantages of a consistently high-level
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approach to environmental performance, including proactive EMS and
practices that exceed regulatory compliance (e.g., Aragôn-Correa &
Sharma, 2003; T. J. Dean & Brown, 1995; Florida & Davison, 2001; Hart,
1995; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). As firms
expand their horizons into more host countries, developing a multiplicity
of EMS to suit each set of local regulations may be economically prohibi-
tive or simply more trouble than it is worth. In the short run, localized sys-
tems may reduce immediate compliance costs in low-regulation coun-
tries. However, developing and maintaining multiple systems to manage a
diverse set of separately evolving policies could have long-term conse-
quences in terms of costs and management challenges. Although firms
will develop compliance-exceeding EMS only when the (not necessarily
exclusively economic) benefits outweigh the costs, increasingly, firms are
doing so.
Furthermore, with increasing numbers of countries adopting stricter
emissions standards or even “take-back” programs for packaging and
products (e.g., electronics, automobiles, and large appliances), worldwide
environmental regulatory trajectories generally are upward “moving tar-
gets” (de Borchgrave, 1993; Gallarotti, 1995; Hoffman, 1997, 2001;
Lewis & Harvey, 2001; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). An increasing reg-
ulatory trajectory makes keeping up with changes in, for example, 20, 30,
or 90 countries’ environmental regulatory systems a daunting and expen-
sive, if not impossible, task. Even though, as of this writing, the movement
for regulations on global warming or greenhouse gases has stalled or over-
all U.S. standards seem to have leveled off or are even being softened, the
evidence that worldwide trends in more operational environmental regu-
lations are increasing is strong. As many countries debate or threaten to
pull out of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, areas as diverse as Bul-
garia, Taiwan, and Ontario, Canada, continue to adopt stricter industrial
emissions and product/packaging take-back requirements.
As regulations continue to increase, expectations on firms for
improved performance will increase as well. Jack Stein, Director of Stra-
tegic Environmental Initiatives at Anheuser Busch, was quoted as saying
the following about this point:
Environmental expectations are going to continue to evolve. To be success-
ful, a company has to keep asking questions over and over about its environ-
mental performance, and never become satisfied with the status quo.
(Kreitz, 2002)
The development of the ISO 14000 and European Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme (EMAS) series of environmental quality standards
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allows firms to develop country-independent EMS—something many
firms have begun to do (Rondinelli & Vastag, 1996). By adopting ISO
14000 or EMAS standards, firms attempt to position themselves to stay
ahead of most countries’ environmental regulation (e.g., Biondi, Frey, &
Iraldo, 2000; Miles, Munilla, & McClurg, 1999). A strong motivation for
firms to improve environmental performance proactively (via ISO 14000
or EMAS) is the potential to remove the firm’s activities from the control
of the direct regulation while providing operational autonomy in each
country in which it operates (cf. Sharfman, Ellington, & Meo, 1999). For a
firm operating globally, ISO 14000 or EMAS certification provides an
organized way for a firm to develop EMS that go beyond compliance in
every host country in which it operates. Developing EMS to certified stan-
dards also provides the firm the ability to manage the various regulatory
pressures it faces in a consistent way worldwide. Here are examples of the
integrative use of the ISO 14000 standards from Motorola and Johnson &
Johnson:
Motorola sites around the world operate under a common EHS Manage-
ment System (MS) framework. All Motorola manufacturing sites are regis-
tered to the globally recognized ISO 14001 environmental management
system standard, through Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance (LRQA).
(Motorola, 2003)
Operating Beyond Compliance with all applicable laws and regulations by
uniformly meeting Johnson & Johnson global environmental policies and
standards, ISO 14001 environmental management system standards, and
other voluntary principles to which we subscribe. (Johnson & Johnson,
2001)
Rugman and Verbeke (1998a) refer to the development of ISO/EMAS
certifiable EMS as creating “internationally transferable green capabili-
ties” (p. 377). This “beyond-compliance” approach may enable the firm to
develop green strategies that provide both cost-based and other competi-
tive advantages as they enter additional foreign markets (Porter & van der
Linde, 1995; Rugman & Verberke, 1998a, 1998b, 2002). When facing
strong domestic and international environmental regulations, such a strat-
egy may be particularly appropriate if it allows the firm to develop econo-
mies of scope both domestically and internationally (Rugman & Verbeke,
1998b), entry barriers (Aragôn-Correa & Sharma, 2003; T. J. Dean &
Brown, 1995), or first-mover advantages (Nehrt, 1998). Dowell, Hart, and
Yeung (2000) suggest that there
appear to be forces that encourage MNEs (multi-national enterprises) to in-
tegrate and standardize their environmental practices globally. . . . By in-
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vesting in state-of-the-art technology and processes . . . MNE facilities may
be able to achieve simultaneously world class costs, quality and environ-
mental performance. In addition, MNEs may reap standardization benefits
and other intangible advantages like positive reputation effects. (p. 1060)
In addition, the global context itself creates unique problems for the
firm. The diversity of cultural, economic, regulatory, and social forces that
firms face as they enter foreign markets creates a level of uncertainty and
complexity quite different from one’s domestic market (e.g., Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). When faced with such uncer-
tainty and complexity, firms likely seek ways to reduce both stressors.
One of the simplest ways to address the uncertainty and complexity is to
limit the elements in the global context that cause them.
Environmental issues themselves are a great source of uncertainty and
complexity (cf. Hoffman, 2001). When firms faced only legal environ-
mental compliance, it was adequate to strive to meet the standards set by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other regulatory bodies.
Success in meeting such standards was easily determined. As a result of
today’s global pressures, more firms are heading toward systemic changes
such as goals for the achievement of sustainability, fundamental changes
to production processes to achieve a zero environmental footprint, work-
ing with customers and suppliers to ensure that their activities are environ-
mentally benign, and so on. If the firm can remove such a large source of
global uncertainty and complexity as the need to create and follow n coun-
tries’ environmental systems generates by shifting to a uniform approach
that exceeds compliance everywhere, it will likely make the choice to do
so (cf. Aragôn-Correa & Sharma, 2003).
Furthermore, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) argue that global firms face
serious challenges developing and maintaining legitimacy once they leave
their home countries. Because legitimacy is essential for firms to operate,
global firms must meet or exceed the legitimacy challenges they face
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, global firms are “expected to
do more than local companies in building their reputation and good-
will, . . . [and] in protecting the environment” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p.
74) at minimum, as much as anything because they face a “liability of
being large and visible” (p. 74). One effective set of legitimacy-seeking
behaviors is for global firms to develop and maintain environmental per-
formance that exceeds compliance wherever they operate. By doing so,
there are fewer pressures when they face the difficulty of having to “man-
age their legitimacy through negotiations with their multiple
environments (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p. 71).
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Legitimacy and its myriad effects on the global firm are too multidi-
mensional to address fully in our limited space (cf. Hoffman, 1999). How-
ever, as we look at the ways in which global firms address the idea, a theme
emerges: legitimacy as the “license to operate” that is key to “long term
survival” (Bansal & Roth, 2000, p. 727). An example of how one global
firm links its environmental management practice to legitimacy as license
to operate is provided by David Francisco, Executive Vice President of
Operations for Newmont Mining. He is quoted on the company’s
sustainability Web page linking the license to operate to the firm’s daily
activities:
Our ability to operate is dependent on our record in terms of safety, environ-
mental stewardship, and our relations with communities. This is our social
license to operate and it must be renewed every day. (Newmont, 2003)
There is, however, an alternative perspective on the linkage between a
firm’s level of globalization and environmental performance that would
seem to contradict our previous arguments. This perspective, known as
the pollution haven hypothesis suggests that multinational firms react to
increasing regulatory and social pressures for environmental performance
in one area by relocating to areas with less stringent regulations (Walter,
1982). The pollution haven hypothesis had received a great amount of
attention but became particularly visible when Laurence Summers (then
chief economist of the World Bank) in a leaked internal memo rather
crassly suggested that
a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country
with the lowest wages. . . . I think the economic logic behind dumping a load
of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable. (Economist, 1992)
However, despite the fact that this quote caused the hypothesis to receive
even more extensive attention, it never received much empirical support
(e.g., Christmann & Taylor, in press; Ferrantino, 1997; Leonard, 1988).
To this point, Mani and Wheeler (1998) argued,
Existing studies have reached mixed conclusions about the impact of devel-
opment and environmental regulations on the international migration of
pollution-intensive industries. Most studies focus on multinational invest-
ment and trade and find negligible displacement effects. However, two
studies (Birdsall & Wheeler, 1992; Lucas, Wheeler, & Hettige, 1992) do
find significant displacement of pollution intensive sectors to developing
countries. . . . All of the existing studies share common weaknesses. They
adopt simplifying assumptions such as constant sectoral pollution intensi-
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ties or abatement across countries. Few studies have looked beyond the di-
chotomy “developed-developing” in controlling the relative degree of reg-
ulation, and none has attempted to assess the separate effects of cross coun-
try regulation and input prices. . . . It seems reasonable to say that empirical
findings are inconclusive because their scope and the supporting data have
been quite limited. (pp. 217-218)
Rugman and Verbeke (1998a) echoed this point and suggested,
There is little empirical evidence supporting the pollution haven case. The
empirical work of Grossman and Krueger (1993) on the activity levels in
Mexico and the maquiladora areas along the U.S.–Mexico border demon-
strates that U.S. MNEs have not shifted production activities there in order
to avoid environmental regulations in the United States. Furthermore, other
empirical evidence also fails to support the claim that international trade
flows are affected by environmental regulations (Walter, 1982; Pearson,
1987; Leonard, 1988; Tobey, 1990). . . . To summarize, our analysis of the
pollution haven hypothesis reveals that environmental regulations at pres-
ent appear to have little effect on the FSA–CSA [firm specific advantages–
country specific advantages] configuration and the location decisions of
MNEs. (p. 371)
In fact, Eskeland and Harrison (1997) found that
our theoretical model indicates that the pollution haven hypothesis is un-
ambiguous only in a very simplistic model of the multinational firm. . . . In a
variety of empirical tests, we have found almost no evidence of pollution
havens. Instead, we find that foreign firms are less polluting than their peers
in developing countries. (p. 28)
Even those studies where modest support for the hypothesis has been
found suggest their own results may be equivocal. For example, the well
known Low and Yeats (1992) study found developing countries were
growing comparative advantages in dirty industries at rates appreciably
faster than developed nations. However, these authors also added that
there is no shortage of competing explanations for dirty industry disper-
sion . . . the idea that trade flows reflected natural resource endowments ap-
pears a little more persuasive . . . the evidence of dirty industry dispersion
examined in this paper is unlikely to be adequately explained by
environmental policy. (p. 103)
Key reasons that the hypothesis may not predict the ways in which
firms will behave include liability and reputation concerns (Lucas et al.,
1992; Dasgupta, Laplante, & Mamingi, 1998) or the effects of political
instability. For example, in 2003, Rio Tinto and British Petroleum PLC
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sold their entire joint stake in the Indonesia’s second largest coal producer
to a local company because of the political risks of doing business in this
arguably poorly environmentally regulated country (Aglionby, 2003).
In a comprehensive report, the International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD) summarized several more explanations why the pol-
lution haven hypothesis has not been supported empirically. They argued,
The costs of environmental compliance are so low relative to other consid-
erations (such as labour costs, political risk, and proximity to resources)
that even if great differences in regulatory stringency existed between juris-
dictions, they would not be enough to prompt a move. . . . Differences in the
stringency of regulations between one jurisdiction and another are not great
enough in most cases to stimulate migration. . . . Firms are increasingly cau-
tious about what standards they follow in overseas operations, knowing that
future regulations in those areas may demand costly retrofits, and mindful
of the opinion of consumer at home. (IISD, 2001, p. 8)
We should note, however, that regardless of the lack of evidence to sup-
port the hypothesis in the aggregate, anecdotal evidence of reprehensible
firm environmental behavior exists in locales where regulations allow it,
and such evidence may not be captured by the research we cite above. The
lack of supporting analyses of the pollution haven hypothesis does “not
account for the behavior of individual firms” (Low & Yeats, 1982, p. 103)
or for the behavior of firms with solely domestic operations.
Despite the fact that the pollution haven hypothesis has not been sup-
ported empirically, Letchumanon and Kodama (2000) point out that
“practitioners such as policy makers, politicians and the business commu-
nity are absolutely convinced of such impacts” (p. 61). The idea that firm
levels of globalization would be a positive force in environmental perfor-
mance is untenable to many in the environmental community. The stereo-
type of the avaricious multinational eschewing environmental regulation
at every turn resonates with many academics and activists. Certainly, there
are numerous examples of firms seemingly or actually engaging in repre-
hensible environmental performance—even firms for whom high-level
environmental performance is a stated goal (e.g., The Body Shop, Royal
Dutch Shell, etc.). We propose, however, that the days where multination-
als might even attempt to find pollution havens are numbered. The forces
we discuss in our model are becoming increasingly powerful at what
appears to be an increasing rate (IISD, 2001). As such, the logical choice
for more globalized firms becomes environmental performance that
exceeds compliance everywhere the firm does business rather than
opportunistically engaging in poor performance simply because it is
possible.
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In addition to regulatory pressures, firms face increasing amounts of
social pressure to be better environmental citizens that may not manifest
in the form of regulations. Reilly (1990) argues that “once the present
seems relatively secure, people can focus on the future” (p. 16). In increas-
ingly greater numbers, citizens of developed and developing nations have
begun to view the present as relatively secure so they are beginning to
worry about the future. Individuals put this concern into action by (among
other things) pressuring corporations to be better environmental citizens.
Although the belief that the present is relatively secure is certainly not uni-
versally shared among all citizens of all nations, the view is shared by a
sufficient number of people to create pressures for change among corpo-
rations. Therefore, as the “need for green” has become an increasingly
important force in developed and developing societies, firms face increas-
ing demands from customers and other stakeholders to adopt increasingly
higher standards of environmental performance (Andrews, 1998;
Hoffman, 2001; Sharfman, Ellington, & Meo, 1997), which requires
behavior beyond compliance and taking steps toward sustainability.
Several writers have provided evidence that societal evaluation of firm
performance concerning this need for green manifests itself through firm
valuation via the stock market. Several studies have found evidence that
positive and negative environmental events for firms had corresponding
effects on the level of stock market returns of the studied firms (Feldman,
Soyka, & Ameer, 1996; Hamilton, 1995; Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996).
These findings suggest that society, through stock markets, rewards firms
that exhibit high levels of environmental performance and similarly pun-
ishes firms that perform poorly. Similarly, using accounting data instead
of market returns, Hart and Ahuja (1996) and Russo and Fouts (1997)
demonstrated a positive relationship between environmental and firm
financial performance. Finally, Dowell et al.’s (2000) results support the
idea that “firms adopting a single, stringent global environmental standard
have much higher market values” (p. 1059).
An additional factor that can induce the firm to go beyond compliance
is the growing recognition that pollution is economic waste—regardless
of where it is generated. By this reasoning, any dollar’s worth of material
going up a smokestack, down a sewer pipe, or into a trashcan is a dollar not
going into the pockets of stockholders. However, understanding this cal-
culus is the easy part. Several writers (e.g., Shaft, Ellington, Meo, &
Sharfman, 1997; Steger, 1996) have argued that firms face a fundamental
challenge in implementing the changes necessary to address this calculus.
Historically, a cost-minimization approach and a local strategy focusing
on compliance were sufficient. However, the growing societal demands
for meaningful improvement in environmental performance (i.e.,
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improvement in the firm’s ability to manage or limit its environmental
“footprint”) require a revolution in environmental management practice
past command and control, “end-of-pipe” compliance technology, or
even pollution-prevention methods toward sustainable practices like the
life-cycle approaches we describe next.
To implement the changes fully that the approach to sustainability
requires, firms are under increasing pressure to manage their environmen-
tal footprint beyond their own boundaries to include the entire physical
system life-cycle of their products or services. This entails an examination
from the creation of inputs to the final disposal, decontamination, recy-
cling, or reuse of outputs. In this approach, the firm improves environ-
mental performance by eliminating waste and emissions before they
occur as well as by identifying more environmentally benign methods and
materials. The institutional pressures or incentives for firms to adopt a
more LCOEM approach come from such disparate sources as the Dutch
regulations concerning Life-Cycle Analysis, U.S. government regula-
tions on CFC labeling of supplied products, EU product and packaging
take-back initiatives such as the German Duales System Deutschland and
the Swedish Kretslopp programs, and the provisions of ISO 14041—the
life-cycle analysis portion of the international standards for environmen-
tal quality. Furthermore, leading-edge firms are raising the standard for
others in their industries by using life-cycle approaches for competitive
advantage (e.g., Baxter Healthcare, AT&T, DuPont, Interface, etc.). In
addition, more and more professional business organizations (e.g., World
Business Council for Sustainable Development, Business for Social
Responsibility, OECD) exert normative pressure on firms to adopt more
life-cycle-oriented approaches. When a firm adopts LCOEM, it addresses
environmental management concerns up and down the physical system
life cycle of its products and services.
LCOEM more fully allows a firm to improve environmental perfor-
mance by addressing environmental impacts both upstream and down-
stream from its own efforts by integrating the environmental activities of
suppliers and the environmental needs of customers as a part of a firm’s
overall environmental management practice. In a world of increasingly
global supply and customer chains, the need for more LCOEM
approaches necessitates the homogenization of the focal firm’s EMS
toward higher levels of environmental performance beyond compliance.
In summary, our argument suggests three sets of forces that influence
firms to adopt global strategies for their corporate environmental perfor-
mance. First, the multiplicity of regulatory trajectories that MNEs face in
the increasingly complex global context provides economic, competitive,
and managerial incentives for them to develop EMS to exceed
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compliance. Second, societal or institutional pressures and green move-
ments throughout the world directly influence firms to improve their envi-
ronmental performance regardless of where they operate. Finally, there is
a global constellation of additional institutional forces pushing firms
toward LCOEM as the organizing model for corporate environmental per-
formance. LCOEM approaches entail high-level environmental perfor-
mance of both focal firms and their suppliers and customers—again coun-
try independent. In the next section, we present a propositional model
(based on globalization and institutional theories) of the antecedents of
high-level environmental performance.
THEORETICAL MODEL
We assert that the higher the level of environmental performance, the
more likely the firm routinely goes beyond regulatory compliance mini-
mums. Although it would appear to be more precise to organize the theory
around a beyond-compliance construct, such a concept is relativistic and
country-contingent, so it does not provide the basis for strong theory. The
“high levels of environmental performance” construct is conceptually
clearer, more widely accepted in the literature, and more amenable to
future operationalization. As our definition of high-level environmental
performance, we adopt the Aragôn-Correa and Sharma (2003) approach,
which is consistent with going beyond compliance and suggests that such
behavior entails
proactive postures [which] involve anticipating future regulations and so-
cial trends and designing or altering operations, processes, and products to
prevent [rather than merely ameliorate] negative environmental impacts.
(p. 74)
Before we present the arguments regarding the globalization and
institutionalization pressures firms face, however, we must introduce a
theoretical control construct—the firm’s level of organizational slack
(e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988).
There is a growing body of literature to suggest that firms’choices in envi-
ronmental performance are economically driven in a way other than one
might normally suppose. Although environmental decisions must make
sense economically, a literature has developed that suggests that only
firms that can afford higher levels of environmental performance make
such choices. Sharma (2000) showed that the environmental management
choices that managers make are dictated in part by the level of discretion-
ary resources (slack) present in organizations. Without sufficient
18 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / March 2004
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016bas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
discretionary resources, managers have little choice but to minimize the
costs of environmental performance—even when there are obvious bene-
fits to exceed the minimum. Because global firms are generally larger,
they are more likely to have such slack resources—furthermore, as
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) argue, global firms also will face concomi-
tantly greater pressures on their legitimacy (e.g., expectations about envi-
ronmental performance), so they are more likely to use such slack
resources to improve environmentally. As such, we predicate our model
on the assumption that managers in global firms have sufficient slack
resources present in their organizations to allow global strategies for
environmental management choices beyond compliance.
Globalization Constructs
We selected the globalization constructs to include in our model by
using three criteria. First, based on a review of the literature, we selected
those constructs that represent the major portions of globalization theory.
Second, we identified constructs most consistent with our observations
regarding the adoption of global strategies toward corporate environmen-
tal performance. Finally, as global strategies are based on both the choices
of management and the context within which the firm operates (cf. Dean,
Sharfman, & Ford, 1991), we selected constructs to represent both ele-
ments. The globalization constructs we include are level of globalization
and global and industry diversification. Our contextual variables repre-
sent the internal and external contexts of the firm—namely, organiza-
tional centralization, formalization, and industry or competitive pres-
sures for global integration and local responsiveness.
Level of globalization. Grant (1995) in his assessment of Levitt’s
(1983) globalization theory suggests that “Levitt’s thesis is not that cus-
tomers are the same the world over. National and regional differences
exist and cannot be ignored. But underlying these differences is a com-
monality of goals” (p. 229). As we argued above, improved environmen-
tal performance is an increasingly common goal across cultures—particu-
larly those cultures that belong to regional trade blocks such as the North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the EU, and the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (cf. Eliste, 2002). The more a firm
competes globally, the more it is exposed to multiple demands on its envi-
ronmental performance. Although a firm competing solely in the EU or
ASEAN blocks would face less variety than a firm that is more broadly
diversified globally (cf. Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), even the EU-focused
firm would face broader institutional pressures than a domestic-focused
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company. At the most basic level, this globalization increases the likeli-
hood of firms’ developing a high-level global approach to environmental
performance. Although the adoption of a global strategy is not sufficient
as a cause of high-level environmental performance in an MNE, we sug-
gest it is necessary. This argument is also consistent with Khanna and
Anton (2001), who found that “firms with a stronger multinational pres-
ence are more likely to adopt a comprehensive EMS” (p. 23), as well as
Christmann and Taylor (in press), who suggest that “globalization
increases institutional and customer pressures on firms to surpass local
requirements even when tempted by lax regulations and enforcement” (p.
23). Kostova and Zaheer (1999) argue that the “greater the number and
variety of counties in which a [global] firm operates, the greater the chal-
lenge [in] . . . maintaining legitimacy” (p. 71). Meyer and Scott (1983)
suggest that an organization’s legitimacy is “negatively affected by the
number of different authorities sovereign over it” (p. 202). Given the
worldwide, rising expectations concerning environmental performance,
firms that exceed local compliance requirements are likely to have fewer
problems maintaining their legitimacy. BASF puts it simply,
Implementing Sustainable Development is especially challenging for a
transnational company: BASF operates in more than 170 countries . . . we
need to develop strategies and tools that can be applied worldwide. (BASF,
2003)
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) puts forth a similar position:
Laws and regulations vary around the world reflecting regional and local
preoccupations and concerns. As a global company with a presence in more
than 55 countries, we believe that we should operate according to global
standards. (ICI, 2003)
This leads to our first proposition:
Proposition 1: The greater the degree of the firm’s globalization, the higher the
level of the firm’s environmental performance.
Global and industry diversification. Although overall globalization
leads to increased environmental performance, we suggest that variation
in the types and locations of business conducted across the globe have an
effect as well. Firms that are narrowly focused in one or two industries
may be more successful at creating limited EMS because of their ability to
develop multidomestic, country-specific strategies. With fewer industries
to manage, it is more possible for a firm to tailor EMS to the countries for
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each industry. Similarly, if a firm operates in only a few countries, it is
more able to create specific EMS for those countries. However, firms that
are more widely diversified across industries or across a wider range of
countries face more difficulty in responding to the multiplicity of
demands they face. As compliance becomes more complicated, firms are
increasingly likely to find ways to relieve their compliance burden via
integrative and comprehensive EMS. The more varied contexts a global
firms faces, the more legitimacy problems it may encounter, and the legiti-
macy problems in one environment may spill over to the other segments of
the global firm (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Going beyond compliance
everywhere it operates allows the global firm to limit legitimacy threats
from the environmental sector. Broadly diversified firms are more likely
to develop EMS to manage the environmental performance that will help
them stay ahead of the regulatory trajectories they face across industries
and countries. It is hard to imagine that a firm would create a unitary
system to meet the lowest standards it faces.
Volvo provides an instructive example of the effect of diversification:
The Volvo Group includes many types of production facilities in many mar-
kets, covering a wide range of production processes. The variation in envi-
ronmental performance is substantial due to differences in technical stan-
dards, legal requirements and environmental awareness. The environmen-
tal requirements represent a first attempt to define minimum levels of se-
lected parameters with a view to promoting more harmonized perfor-
mance. One example of its use is to establish minimum environmental per-
formance in [newly] acquired production facilities, regardless of produc-
tion volume. The basic principle is that Volvo operations shall comply with
the relevant legal requirements or with the environmental requirements for
Volvo Group Production, whichever are more stringent. (Volvo, 2003)
This argument leads onto our next two propositions.
Proposition 2: The more diversified the firm is across industries, the higher the
level of the firm’s environmental performance.
Proposition 3: The more diversified the firm is across countries, the higher the
level of the firm’s environmental performance.
Dooley and Fryxell (1999) investigated the effects of different types of
diversification on environmental performance in domestic firms. Their
results suggest that our propositions are most likely to hold for firms with
related diversification strategies as opposed to firms with unrelated (con-
glomerate) diversification approaches. The more unrelated the diversifi-
cation, the more difficult it is to implement a unified approach to
environmental management.
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Strategic choices like we describe above do not take place independent
of the firm’s context. Ghoshal and Nohria (1993) investigated the relation-
ship between three organizational dimensions and the globalized firm’s fit
with the business environments in which it operated. Two of these dimen-
sions have proliferated in the organization literature: formalization and
centralization (e.g., Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968). Ghoshal
and Nohria use normative integration (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979) as a
third dimension. We consider these three dimensions as explanatory con-
structs regarding globalized-firm environmental performance.
Formalization. The key element in formalization is the extent to which
firms create extensive written policies to govern their day-to-day opera-
tions (cf. Pugh et al., 1968). Ghoshal and Nohria (1993) suggest that glob-
alized firms that develop more formalized policies and procedures imple-
ment said procedures across all their subsidiaries. Such standardization
makes implementation more consistent but also limits local discretion.
Because formalized bureaucratic systems to govern environmental per-
formance limit local discretion, globalized firms must develop these sys-
tems to meet or exceed any local standard the firm encounters, or face the
consequence of violating local regulations. For example, the formaliza-
tion of EHS systems through the adoption of the chemical industry’s
Responsible Care program led to major EHS-management improvements
particularly at larger firms (Kappas, 2000). By formalizing standards, the
firm will likely push the overall firm level of environmental performance
up. This argument leads to our next proposition:
Proposition 5: The more formalized a firm, the higher the firm’s level of envi-
ronmental performance.
Centralization. Centralization places power and control of the firm and
its resources in the hands of top management. In the case of the globalized
firm, this usually means the corporate headquarters. Centralization also
limits or removes local autonomy. When firms are centralized, they put in
place control systems to support that centralization. By curtailing local
autonomy, firms also take away their subsidiaries’ options in responding
to environmental regulation. However, when the firm centralizes, it must
ensure that it at least meets all local requirements. Because compliance is
the minimum for most firms and requirements vary broadly across coun-
tries, firms with centralized systems will be forced to develop EMS that
allow them to stay ahead of compliance wherever they operate (see the
examples from Bristol-Myers Squibb, General Motors, Johnson &
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Johnson, and Motorola we mention above). This argument leads to our
next proposition:
Proposition 6: The more centralized a firm, the higher the firm’s level of envi-
ronmental performance.
Normative integration. Normative integration occurs when employees
are socialized “into a set of goals, values and beliefs that then shape their
perspectives and behavior” (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1993). Building on Van
Maanen and Schein (1979), we suggest that organizational culture is both
formed by the process of normative integration and in turn stimulates this
integration. As the firm becomes more normatively integrated, control in
the firm becomes dominated by the organization’s dominant values and
beliefs, that is, its culture. Although the control that shared values and
beliefs exert is informal (Ouchi, 1980), it still homogenizes behavior
throughout a firm. All firms must, at least, meet compliance requirements,
and localities vary in their regulations. When a firm is normatively inte-
grated, it will be compelled to develop a unified approach to address envi-
ronmental performance. To insure compliance, in firms with strong levels
of normative integration, the corporate values and beliefs behind the EMS
will push the firm toward environmental performance that exceeds com-
pliance in most localities—just to make sure the minimums are met in all
localities. Here is an example of how Dow Chemical pursues normative
integration of its perspective toward sustainable development throughout
the company:
Doing good for the environment is not just driven by moral considerations.
It simply makes good business sense as well. The ability to integrate the
principles of Sustainable Development might very well become a deter-
mining factor in the long-term survival of companies. . . . In 2002, we made
significant progress in integrating the 12-Point Sustainable Development
Operating Plan with the various businesses, functional, and site strategies
within the company. Within Dow, the major mechanism for delineating
strategy and implementation is called the Managing Improvement, or MI,
Plan. Over a dozen businesses have completed a mapping of the 12-Point
Plan with their MI Plan, looking for gaps and areas of strength. This then
leads to action items for the individual businesses. The focus for 2003 will
be on a broader education tool for Dow employees. We are working with the
World Business Council on Sustainable Development to develop and use an
on-line training tool designed for use by all employees and intended to pro-
vide personal relevance to all employees. This effort is scheduled to be
piloted in the first half of 2003, with rollout in the second half. (Dow, 2002)
Such normative integration is even more likely when firms have high lev-
els of individual concern for environmental issues among their employees
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or from top management, although resistance from specific facilities or
countries might impede the integration process (Bansal & Roth, 2000).
This argument leads to our next proposition:
Proposition 7: The more normatively integrated the firm, the higher the firm’s
level of environmental performance.
Pressure for global integration and local responsiveness. Although
the organization’s characteristics should be strong drivers of environmen-
tal performance, we anticipate that the external context within which the
firm finds itself also has major effects. In particular, industries themselves
push firms toward global integration or local responsiveness. In commod-
ity industries (coal, steel, cotton), products are not particularly differentia-
ble, there is little or no need for products to be locally responsive, and
there are considerable economic incentives for global integration. Alter-
natively, in consumer industries (food, clothing, cosmetics), although
some products can succeed everywhere around the world (Levi’s,
McDonalds, Coca-Cola), increasingly, consumers want products tailored
to their needs and wants. When firms operate more in industries where
global integration is the dominant force, they are more likely to develop
global high-performing EMS that allow them to insure that compliance is
exceeded everywhere they operate. Coca-Cola provides us an interesting
example of how global integration leads to the development of integrated
environmental systems. In a speech to the 2002 Global Environmental
Management Initiative’s annual meeting, Carl Ware, Vice President for
Public Affairs and Administration at Coca-Cola, indicated the following:
For a company that does business in more than 200 countries, each with its
own set of labor and environmental laws, this can be an exceedingly frus-
trating and challenging experience. . . . [It] forces a company’s management
to agree on a set of core principles for which the company stands and by
which it will abide that is good for the global community, for the company
and for its shareholders. (Steele, 2002)
This argument leads to our next proposition:
Proposition 8: When firms operate in predominately globally integrated indus-
tries, they will exhibit higher overall levels of environmental performance.
When firms tailor their strategies to the needs of local environments,
they likely will tailor their EMS to the countries in which they operate.
Locally tailored systems will tend to produce environmental performance
that follows a different pattern. By focusing on local rather than global
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standards, firms are more likely to focus on compliance (as a maximum)
everywhere they operate. As such, they will experience wider variance
across countries, particularly if they operate in both higher and lower reg-
ulation environments. For example, locally focused firms with operations
ranging from Bangladesh (a lower regulation environment) to the Nether-
lands (one of the highest regulation environments) will exhibit enormous
variety in their levels of environmental performance across their opera-
tions. In addition to wider variance in performance, firms that focus solely
on local regulation likely will exhibit a lower average level of environ-
mental performance (by country) than the firm that adopts a global
perspective. This argument leads to our next proposition:
Proposition 9: When firms operate in industries where local responsiveness
predominates, they will exhibit lower average levels of environmental per-
formance per country.
Institutional Constructs
Whereas the globalization constructs we describe above address the
strategic pressures placed on firms, there are forces in the firm’s institu-
tional context that push them toward global EMS strategies. MNE envi-
ronmental performance is shaped by the institutional context within
which firms find themselves. In their institutional arguments, DiMaggio
and Powell (1983) suggest that there are three sets of forces that push
firms toward similarity or isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and norma-
tive. Sharfman et al. (1997) argue that there are elements of each of these
forces in the global institutional environment that act as prime drivers
pushing firms toward improved environmental performance (cf.
Deephouse, 1996; Haveman, 1993). In this section, we describe the spe-
cific elements of the institutional forces in our model.
Coercive pressures and regulation. Coercive pressures in environmen-
tal management come mainly from regulation. Because the regulatory tra-
jectories in most countries are a moving target, typically upward, firms
have to develop a rational way to address the changes. Increasingly, firms
address these frequent changes in the institutional environment by devel-
oping EMS that remove them from regulation (e.g., Sharfman et al.,
1999). Even if firms cannot remove themselves from regulation, the pres-
ence of extensive regulatory structures in several countries pushes firms
toward EMS that put them ahead of the regulations as much as possible.
To this point, de Borchgrave (1993) argued,
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Adopting a proactive and far-reaching environmental strategy allows orga-
nizations to anticipate rather than submit to emerging regulatory con-
straints and to profit from the opportunities environmental trends present in
terms of competitive positioning. (p. 48)
Conoco used its desire to maintain operating autonomy and environmen-
tal innovation to both improve its environmental performance and remove
itself from regulatory strictures:
With its threat of MACT (maximum available control technology), the
CAAA (Clean Air Act Amendments) stood to severely constrain Conoco’s
activities. . . . Conoco values its operating autonomy even more than most
firms. Given this likely restraint of the firm’s discretion, Conoco used inno-
vation to avoid the pressure of this regulation at the CCU sites while main-
taining its operating autonomy. (Sharfman et al., 1999, pp. 105-106)
This leads to our next proposition:
Proposition 10: The higher the average level of regulation that a firm faces
across the countries in which it does business, the higher the firm’s level of
environmental performance.
Mimetic pressure and strategic isomorphism. Firms also face general
mimetic pressures from market leaders (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In
regard to environmental performance, as American firms venture further
abroad in their activities, they face firms (mainly from Europe, such as
ABB, Statoil, Volvo) for whom environmental performance is a competi-
tive advantage (e.g., Kärrberg, personal communication, August 8, 1997).
These firms engage in activities so far beyond compliance that they raise
the bar environmentally for everyone competing in their industry or coun-
try combinations (e.g., Shaft, Sharfman, & Swahn, 2002). When the
mimetic pressure toward isomorphism is targeted on environmental per-
formance, the dynamic will be different. In such cases, leading firms are
likely to concentrate on behaviors that will provide them with competitive
advantage. By doing so, the leading firms will move the overall level of
environmental performance in their industries up, not down. This
dynamic is especially likely in industries with a great deal of cohesion
(Bansal & Roth, 2000), that is, strong interconnections between and
among actors. In the following quote, we see how Johnson & Johnson
attempts to exert mimetic pressures:
Compliance with regulatory requirements is a starting point, but as a corpo-
rate leader we must do more by encouraging . . . global standards for perfor-
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mance. . . . We are implementing global . . . standards that go beyond local
country regulations. (Johnson & Johnson, 2001)
This leads to our next proposition:
Proposition 11: The higher the level of mimetic environmental isomorphic
pressures it faces, the higher the firm’s level of environmental performance.
External normative pressures. As we argue above, all firms face
increasing external normative pressures for improved environmental per-
formance from specific societies, activists, and nongovernmental organi-
zations. The normative elements of the business environment pose partic-
ular difficulties for global firms as they work to maintain legitimacy
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Normative elements come from the value
structure of a society, are more tacit, and hence are more difficult for an
outsider to learn. The external normative pressures firms face to improve
their environmental performance are manifest in many ways. Some of the
pressure comes from the media, some comes from nongovernmental
organizations, and others come from shareholders. Although firms will
vary in the responses to these types of institutional pressures (Oliver,
1991), the general trend seems to be that when firms face high levels of
external normative pressure for environmental performance, they tend to
increase the level of their environmental performance. In the following
text, Dow Chemical describes how the license to operate concept comes
from society and is part of the values underlying its entire approach to sus-
tainable development:
The world is rapidly changing. Scarcity of resources, continuing popula-
tion growth and the influence of human activity on the future of the world
are causes for concern. Society, which ultimately holds our license to oper-
ate and grow, expects industry to play its part in the resolution of these is-
sues. In return, companies that take on this challenge can look forward to a
better relationship with community neighbors, a boost in employee motiva-
tion, increased customer loyalty, reduced costs and liabilities and a better
corporate reputation. All of which have a direct or indirect influence on a
company’s financial results. (Dow, 2002)
This argument leads to our last proposition:
Proposition 12: The higher the level of external normative pressures toward
improved environmental performance it faces, the higher the firm’s level of
environmental performance.
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DISCUSSION
In this article, we present a propositional model that links institutional
and globalization theory together as a theoretical answer to the following
question: Why do multinational firms exceed compliance? Whereas neo-
classical economic theory might suggest that behavior exceeding compli-
ance is irrational—at least in the short term—we see examples of such
behavior every day. However, previously, we have had only limited theo-
retical explanations as to why such behavior occurs (e.g., Aragôn-Correa
& Sharma, 2003; Bansal & Roth, 2000). In this article, we propose that as
firms increase in their levels of globalization (i.e., adopt more of a truly
global or geocentric strategy), they face increasing strategic and institu-
tional pressures that cause them to rationalize their environmental efforts
upward. Such firms are the ones most likely to exceed compliance wher-
ever they operate. Rather than devolving their activities to the lowest com-
mon denominator as the pollution haven hypothesis might suggest, under
the conditions that we specify, firms will rationalize up. For example, as
regulatory trajectories coalesce upward among countries, firms lose dis-
cretion in their activities and increase their costs if they must manage mul-
tiple environmental management schemas. As societies around the world
ratchet up the level of environmental performance that they expect from
firms, it is easier for an MNE to rationalize its EMS upward. As industry-
leading firms define environmental performance as a source of
competitive advantage, follower firms feel pressure to adopt such
practices.
The key implication from our model is that environmental perfor-
mance for globalized firms is becoming a response to global pressures
rather than to specific local regulations. Whereas firms that are heavily
globalized are likely to behave as our propositions suggest, it is likely
through isomorphic pressures that smaller firms will follow suit. These
firms may not necessarily have adopted a greener attitude but may change
their behavior simply because of the pressures that more proactive global
firms (e.g., ABB, AT&T, DuPont, etc.) exert throughout their industries
and throughout the world. The specific effects of mimetic, isomorphic,
and other institutional forces would be very fruitful future research areas.
We recognize that the model may be perceived as anywhere from
counterintuitive to heretical by members of the environmental commu-
nity. Each time the World Trade Organization and other proponents of
globalization meet, the streets surrounding the site become a battleground
in no small measure because of the perception of what globalization has
done to the environment around the world. In this article, we propose a
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theory that suggests the opposite. Few will argue that multinationals have
not, in the past, wreaked havoc on ecologies around the globe—in both
home and host countries. However, as the cliché suggests, “That was
then—this is now.” The multinationals of the past could be seen as interna-
tional (ethnocentric) in their strategy, that is, attempting to extend their
domestic markets by simply selling their existing products abroad (e.g.,
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989) and exploiting their foreign environment at the
same time. However, recent literature in international business suggests
that such a strategy was largely unsuccessful and is rarely followed by
MNEs today (e.g., Hill, 2003). This was seen as the cheapest approach,
and there were few pressures to behave otherwise. As we argued above,
consistent with Reilly (1990), global firms in the 21st century face a world
of increasing regulation, increasing social attention, and increasing mar-
ket pressures concerning their performance in general—not just their
environmental performance. They face the need to balance globalization
with local responsiveness, but the pressures for the adoption of global
strategies, particularly in terms of environmental performance, seem to be
winning. The idea of a pollution haven—where the multinational would
stash dirty processes, products, or wastes—is increasingly a thing of the
past. Today’s multinational faces incredible scrutiny from governments,
nongovernmental organizations, communities, and other stakeholders
particularly because of the pervasiveness of the Internet. Although lead-
ing firms (e.g., Nike) face more pressure than do lower tier companies
(e.g., Reebok), all MNEs face increased scrutiny. Furthermore, normative
institutional pressures (e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative) to make cor-
porate activity more transparent increase this scrutiny even further. This
scrutiny has increased the cost of pollution for many reasons, including
the increased risk of discovery, reputation effects, and increased threats of
lawsuits. The increase in the potential costs of pollution has reached a
point that the logical action for the global firm is to rationalize environ-
mental systems to stay ahead of the regulations and other pressures firms
face. Being reactive is expensive while being proactive can limit the costs
and hassles of compliance (Porter & van der Linde, 1995; Sharfman et. al,
1999) as well as the transactions costs involved in a global strategy. We do
not propose that when global firms rationalize their environmental sys-
tems toward the highest common denominator, they are doing so neces-
sarily out of any sense of moral or ethical imperative. Although that may
be the case for some individual firms, the model we propose in this article
is predicated on the idea that good performance by a global firm in today’s
context entails high levels of green performance (cf. Allenby, 2000).
One might question whether firms that appear to exceed compliance
engage in so-called greenwashing (dressing up their activities in an
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environmental patina) or whether their performance is truly well above
standards. However, the dawn of the Internet age has put firms under scru-
tiny like never before. As a result, greenwashing put in the place of real
environmental performance is more likely to be detected. In the speech we
cite above, Carl Ware of Coca-Cola also described the effect that this scru-
tiny has on his firm. Steele Communications (2002) described him as
saying,
People seem to expect more from his company than they do of many others,
likely due to the worldwide visibility of the Coca-Cola brand and the sheer
size and reach of the organization [and that] . . . the Internet has enabled
groups to clothe the sheerest nonsense in the garb of respectability and send
it twice around the world with the click of a mouse . . . [so] acting with integ-
rity has always been a competitive advantage and is even more so in today’s
wired world.
The answer to the questions concerning greenwashing ultimately is an
empirical one, and there are several other interesting future research
issues here as well. Do the pressures we describe above inhibit or facilitate
greenwashing? As firms face more pressures for improved environment,
it may create an incentive to make their performance look as green as pos-
sible while doing as little as possible. As such, there would be a concomi-
tant incentive to greenwash rather than to fundamentally change systems.
In this circumstance, there is asymmetric information between the firm
and any observers. The firm knows exactly what it is doing. Observers can
go only by what they can see. Alternatively, however, several recent, high-
publicity problems faced by supposedly environmentally proactive firms
(e.g., The Body Shop) would suggest that between governments, activists,
nongovernmental organizations, and societies, there are sufficient moni-
toring capabilities to catch greenwashing and sufficient penalties (includ-
ing reputation effects) if firms engage in such practices. Furthermore, do
the pressures affect greenwashing more in consumer-oriented firms than
industrial marketers? Consumer-oriented firms generate more public visi-
bility and may have more incentive to behave better. However, industrial
marketers often engage in dirtier processes that generate concerns with
governments and activist groups, thus creating a different type of
visibility. The question becomes who faces more pressure to perform
better?
A related question about the effects of these forces concerns whether
manufacturing or marketing operations face greater pressure. Tradition-
ally, firms face the greatest environmental pressure when they engage in
manufacturing, with less pressure occurring when firms engage in only
in-country marketing and sales activities. The new regulatory challenges
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that marketing organizations face come from a broad increase in product
and packaging take-back requirements. As product and packaging take-
back requirements increase, firms without in-country manufacturing
operations face more extensive challenges to address the new regulations.
If a firm has an in-country manufacturing plant, then it can integrate prod-
uct and packaging take-back into manufacturing far more easily. If a firm
does not have in-country manufacturing and faces take-back regulations,
then it has to set up a separate system, participate in a collective system (if
such a thing exists), or outsource for take-back. Although the scrutiny that
take-back generates may pale next to the pressures of manufacturing or
extraction, the distinction concerning regulatory intensity between where
the firm operates and where it manufacturers is less than it used to be and
deserves further examination. Alternatively, perhaps the question is not
manufacturing versus sales or marketing but again concerns consumer
versus industrial marketers. Do consumer marketers face greater scrutiny
regardless of whether they manufacture in country? Future research will
also help answer all these questions.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we develop a model to clarify why firms engage in levels
of environmental performance that routinely exceeds compliance. Starik
and Rands (1995) suggest a multilevel approach to understanding how
and why firms head toward sustainable practice. We choose the institu-
tional level upon which to focus our theory, consistent with the approach
of authors such as Jennings and Zandbergen (1995) or Hoffman (1999).
Rather than examining the internal workings of the firm, the values of its
managers, or the economics of green behavior, we present a macrolevel
theory of firm environmental performance. We posit that firms respond in
terms of environmental performance to the context within which they find
themselves. Today, firms adopting a global strategy find themselves in a
context where the most appropriate and effective choice is to rationalize
their environmental performance to a standard that places them ahead of
compliance and social pressures.
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